MG's free-will extravaganza

Confident Learner Joined: Jul 28, 2009 Posts: 98

MG wrote:

It should be pointed out the first criteria for this thread has yet to be met, that being a good definition of "free-will" we can work with

.

OC in the Creation of "satan" thread wrote:

Defining free will is a fair question. I would define it as the ability to make a choice independent of outside coercion.

Well, I think OC did a fine job defining free will in the creation of satan thread. It's simply being able to do what you want to do, what is in accordance with your beliefs, desires and values. This definition is, of course, the type of free will defended by compatibilists. This ought to be the end of the story, but people with certain agendas (fears?) don't like this view of things because as you point out, MockingGods, it makes us seem as if we are soft, hairy robots. It means that who we are- our knowledge, beliefs, desires and our values- just have come to be, without our taking some view from nowhere, outside time and space, and putting ourselves (our self ) together. The self doing the deciding is a product of a vast confluence of contingencies that we did not choose. Tom Clark has said that but for different circumstances go I (actually a highly humanizing and compassionate way of viewing the other, I think).

At any rate, you ask a good question when you ask "What exactly is our will free from?" I'm struggling to understand what it is so important that we be free from myself.

Posted: Thu Feb 25, 2010 1:04 am

M_G, I'll try not to inflict too much of my ignorance on the forum! Wink

OC in the Creation of "satan" thread wrote:

Defining free will is a fair question. I would define it as the ability to make a choice independent of outside coercion.

invixxtus, OC's definition doesn't go far enough, he forgets internal coercion... including internalisation of past environment, exchanges and interactions... saying that, if only we weren't interfered with by (usu. governments and secular laws) we'd do the right thing if we accept Jesus/Buddha etc. is bunk. Ask any Catholic. Actually, ask any human!

You have genetic/developmental predetermined tendencies overlaid with neural connections formed over time, and then any aberrations or damage need to be taken into account. This says something of the current understanding of how we make choices. Add to that the understanding of plasticity and it gets interesting!

wiki wrote:

Free will raises the question whether , and in what sense, rational agents exercise control over their actions, decisions, or choices. Addressing this question requires understanding the relationship between freedom and cause, and determining whether the laws of nature are causally deterministic.

I'd add to that 'and to what extent' - it's not that we walk around like automatons running a four billion year programme (run by the mice Wink

) more like we inherit the game and play within it, some do better than others. But we all have to fight. No you are not a beautiful and unique snowflake! (except to your mum!)

HAH! 'Robot' is such a typical theist response... and while it sounds like a great comeback, it falls so, so short of a true understanding of what naturalism has to say on the matter... much reading to do chiao! L8tR Smile

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

MockingGods wrote:

The OC wrote:

Sounds like you are describing a robot. I don't find it plausible.

It's interesting that you should make this analogy. A device humans have created, the computer, might be the best way of looking at this issue. In many ways it's much like a human being so it shouldn't be surprising that we crafted something like this. It basically starts out as a blank slate, with a simple input and output system, just like humans. In the beginning it can make only rudimentary of decisions. In fact, in human society we don't hold people under a certain age morally/legally responsible for what they do in the same way that we hold older units responsible who have collect more data. As the computer is given more data it can perform more complex processes, just like humans. The computer can't control how it obtained its parts, just like human biology. The computer can't control the environment that feeds it the data that allows for more complex decisions, which I believe is the same process that takes place in the biological machine of the human being.

Your analogy is extremely rough. Insects are computers too. There is a large gap between the human mind and a machine. Very large. The truing test has never been successfully completed.

Here is a semi interesting radio program on the subject.

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

invixxtus wrote:

The self doing the deciding is a product of a vast confluence of contingencies that we did not choose. Tom Clark has said that but for different circumstances go I (actually a highly humanizing and compassionate way of viewing the other, I think).

I agree that the confluence of external circumstances is necessary for making the choices we do, but I do not think it is an exhaustive explanation for why we do what we do.

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

iPondR wrote:

M_G, I'll try not to inflict too much of my ignorance on the forum! Wink

OC in the Creation of "satan" thread wrote:

Defining free will is a fair question. I would define it as the ability to make a choice independent of outside coercion.

invixxtus, OC's definition doesn't go far enough, he forgets internal coercion... including internalisation of past environment, exchanges and interactions... saying that, if only we weren't interfered with by (usu. governments and secular laws) we'd do the right thing if we accept Jesus/Buddha etc. is bunk. Ask any Catholic. Actually, ask any human!

You have genetic/developmental predetermined tendencies overlaid with neural connections formed over time, and then any aberrations or damage need to be taken into account. This says something of the current understanding of how we make choices. Add to that the understanding of plasticity and it gets interesting!

Actually my revised definition for this thread is ...

OrdinaryClay wrote:

Free Will is defined as a rational agent exercising the ability to select from a set of choices given a state of existence at some particular time. The set of choices can be finite and still allow for the agent to be of a free will. The state of existence may include material circumstances or other free will choices.

Confident Learner Joined: Jul 28, 2009 Posts: 98

OrdinaryClay wrote:

invixxtus wrote:

The self doing the deciding is a product of a vast confluence of contingencies that we did not choose. Tom Clark has said that but for different circumstances go I (actually a highly humanizing and compassionate way of viewing the other, I think).

I agree that the confluence of external circumstances is necessary for making the choices we do, but I do not think it is an exhaustive explanation for why we do what we do.

Respectfully, I think you are misreading me a little here. Clearly external circumstances that obtain at the time we are making a decision effect the decision we make. What I am saying is that the self doing the deciding- one's beliefs, desires, and values- has come to be as it is as a consequence of a vast confluence of contingencies that would include all the facts of one's current external circumstances (as well as the individuals unique genetic makeup and all of her past experiences). So, yes, we do what we do because we are who we are in the situation that we are in at a point in time, in accordance with our will (our beliefs, desires and values)- and if we are free from outside coercion then we might say that we have free will in this minimalist sense- but we never step outside ourselves to cause any of that stuff to come to be as it is. But for different circumstances go I.

Confident Learner Joined: Jul 28, 2009 Posts: 98

OC wrote:

Free Will is defined as a rational agent exercising the ability to select from a set of choices given a state of existence at some particular time. The set of choices can be finite and still allow for the agent to be of a free will. The state of existence may include material circumstances or other free will choices.

OC, I see this definition as being compatible with determinism. Do you still believe that a decision must be nondeterministic to be truly free? Also, why do you believe that a robot could not be made that could be said to have this type of free will? I'm getting the impression that you want for there to something more to it than just what your definition of free will says.

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

invixxtus wrote:

OC wrote:

Free Will is defined as a rational agent exercising the ability to select from a set of choices given a state of existence at some particular time. The set of choices can be finite and still allow for the agent to be of a free will. The state of existence may include material circumstances or other free will choices.

Do you still believe that a decision must be nondeterministic to be truly free?

I thought I had clarified that here , but if MG does not mind I will answer quickly. I do in the sense that the cause of the choice(the free agent) can chose from multiple options at any given point in the same set of current circumstances.

Quote:

Also, why do you believe that a robot could not be made that could be said to have this type of free will?

I don't know to be honest. Since who ever is able to accomplish this will make an enormous amount of money and gain prestige, we can say with confidence there are some very well funded and talented people working on it. If it is doable it will be done, no doubt. The longer we go with no success also says something. Time will tell.

Confident Learner Joined: Jul 28, 2009 Posts: 98

OC wrote:

I do in the sense that the cause of the choice(the free agent) can chose from multiple options at any given point in the same set of current circumstances.

I am of the opinion that digging into just what exactly you mean by this would have the effect of making the notion of assigning responsibility to the agent incoherent. We have been there before so I think pursuing that line of argument would more repetitious than I care to dedicate time to. At any rate, I am tired of trying to pull teeth here, so I will move my last post from the creation of satan thread here because I think that it may include much information that is germane to the subject and may be of interest to some others who may not have seen it. At least I hope that it is. So long for now.

OC wrote:

Maybe we should go to first principals. Please define your use of cause.

Well, in this context my contention is that one's brain state at the time of making a decision is a sufficient condition for the decision being made (I'm following Daniel Dennett and Richard Carrier here in my definition of determinism, by the way: "There is at any instant exactly one physically possible future." (Van Innwagen 1983, p. 3) from Dan Dennett's Freedom Evolves (p. 25) and from Richard Carrier, "Determinism is the view that the future is as fixed as the past, and cannot proceed any differently than it actually will." Sense and Goodness Without God , p. 97)) . My concept of causality is nothing fancy, Wiki is fine: "Causality is the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is a consequence of the first." Our experience of making a decision is one of deliberating on the basis of one's knowledge, including past experiences, and one's values and desires (or, in the case of robots, the decision could be made on the basis of algorithms), but strictly speaking one's brain state at the time of the decision is a sufficient cause of the decision made. So, given brain state X, decision A will follow.

So, in order for an agent to be able to make a truly free nondeterministic selection the agent ought to be able to make a decision regardless of his/her brain state at the time of deciding. This elbow room (to borrow Dennett's phrase) would necessitate the introduction of some type of 1) supernatural component (dualism) or 2) some type of "quantum-fluctuation amplifier" at the level of the neurons (a la Robert Kane The Significance of Free Will (1996), as disscused in Dennett's Freedom Evolves ). Or there may be some other way in which this indeterminism might arise that you have not yet made specific. In both cases it is difficult to see how this indeterminism could preserve moral responsibility. Since you are now saying that the agent does indeed cause the decision, but you still maintain that this decision is truly free and nondeterministic, and you are not inclined to defend dualism, then I must assume that you are defending the position that nondeterminism enters in via option 2. At any rate, I think you have been coy about just what happens when an agent makes a decision, so I will offer you the opportunity to flesh this out.

I should note the potential for added (but relevant) nuance here with the notion of determinism as it relates to causation. Daniel Dennett in his book Freedom Evolves makes the point that determinism and causation are not the same thing. His point is that if determinism is true then there may still be things that happen that are, so to speak, uncaused. What he means (or, I should say, what I take him to mean) is that when dealing with a highly complex phenomena- i.e. the cause of a hurricane, for example, or pin pointing the cause of a war- there may be so many variables involved that a sufficient cause cannot be identified. So we may be able to say that, in a sense, given determinism, uncaused events may nonetheless occur. I mention this because this might be one way in which we might say that an agent makes a decision that is "uncaused", although this uncaused decision is taking place in an utterly deterministic environment. The decision would still be caused by the totality of variables as they are at the time of the decision being made, we would just not be able to say that one variable was the case. I wouldn't take this to be a truly free selesction, though, in the sense that I think you are meaning it. And if this is the sense in which you mean to say that a decision is free, then I think you are inviting a host of other problems, primarily theological ones.

OC wrote:

I've never meant to imply the free willed agent was not a cause. The free willed agent of course does cause the choice.

What would it mean for a free willed agent to cause a choice to be made, but for that choice to still be a truly free, nondeterministic selection the likes of which is not possible for AI given current technology?

OC wrote:

Good, you must agree then that if randomness exists then non-deterministic events could occur.

Not necessarily. A computer program designed to generate random numbers would be generating numbers that are random but would nonetheless be a deterministic system. So randomness is compatible with determinism and it's presence does not mean that an event is nondeterministic in the metaphysical sense. But, back to the other horn of the dilemma: how would introducing randomness at the level of decision making still allow the agent to be morally responsible for the decision?

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

invixxtus wrote:

OC wrote:

I do in the sense that the cause of the choice(the free agent) can chose from multiple options at any given point in the same set of current circumstances.

I am of the opinion that digging into just what exactly you mean by this would have the effect of making the notion of assigning responsibility to the agent incoherent.

I think it is a bit unfair to claim my position is incoherent. First, no one in science can describe what emergence means when it comes to the conscious mind. Given this fact, I would claim that any attempt to make a claim that mind is a deterministic flow from State A to State B an unwarranted extrapolation. As in, we know how some dynamical systems work therefore the mind/brain relationship is the same. Second, in any possible(deterministic or non-deterministic) system we start from a certain State A and move to another State B. My claim is that what happens in the human mind is that this transition is a coherent many to many transition. Determinists have not demonstrated that it is in fact a one to one any more then I can definitively demonstrate it as a many to many.

Quote:

We have been there before so I think pursuing that line of argument would more repetitious than I care to dedicate time to. At any rate, I am tired of trying to pull teeth here, so I will move my last post from the creation of satan thread here because I think that it may include much information that is germane to the subject and may be of interest to some others who may not have seen it. At least I hope that it is. So long for now.

Okay, Now I'm not sure MG wanted theistic premises to be entered into this discussion but since you have brought the subject up I will respond. Smile

Quote:

OC wrote:

Maybe we should go to first principals. Please define your use of cause.

Well, in this context my contention is that one's brain state at the time of making a decision is a sufficient condition for the decision being made (I'm following Daniel Dennett and Richard Carrier here in my definition of determinism, by the way: "There is at any instant exactly one physically possible future." (Van Innwagen 1983, p. 3) from Dan Dennett's Freedom Evolves (p. 25) and from Richard Carrier, "Determinism is the view that the future is as fixed as the past, and cannot proceed any differently than it actually will." Sense and Goodness Without God , p. 97)) . My concept of causality is nothing fancy, Wiki is fine: "Causality is the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is a consequence of the first." Our experience of making a decision is one of deliberating on the basis of one's knowledge, including past experiences, and one's values and desires (or, in the case of robots, the decision could be made on the basis of algorithms), but strictly speaking one's brain state at the time of the decision is a sufficient cause of the decision made. So, given brain state X, decision A will follow.

This seems to me to beg the question(my bold). As you asked me, I can in turn ask you, "What exactly do you mean?" Can you describe this dynamical system called consciousness? Of course not. No one can. You extrapolate from the dynamical systems we do know. When people talk about emergent systems they often talk about something like, bird flocks, or insect colonies. These are trivial and uninteresting when it comes to the emergent complexity we see in the mind. We can actually simulate these levels of emergence using automatons with simple rules. We can not simulate consciousness, at least not at the level of the human mind.

Quote:

So, in order for an agent to be able to make a truly free nondeterministic selection the agent ought to be able to make a decision regardless of his/her brain state at the time of deciding. This elbow room (to borrow Dennett's phrase) would necessitate the introduction of some type of 1) supernatural component (dualism) or 2) some type of "quantum-fluctuation amplifier" at the level of the neurons (a la Robert Kane The Significance of Free Will (1996), as disscused in Dennett's Freedom Evolves ). Or there may be some other way in which this indeterminism might arise that you have not yet made specific. In both cases it is difficult to see how this indeterminism could preserve moral responsibility. Since you are now saying that the agent does indeed cause the decision, but you still maintain that this decision is truly free and nondeterministic, and you are not inclined to defend dualism, then I must assume that you are defending the position that nondeterminism enters in via option 2. At any rate, I think you have been coy about just what happens when an agent makes a decision, so I will offer you the opportunity to flesh this out.

Perhaps you could explain what a "quantum-fluctuation amplifier" is? Is this like a "flux capacitor"? I think this is make believe. Wink

There is a third possibility, you agreed earlier there are stochastic processes in nature, well maybe an emergent consciousness has a stochastic component, which does not imply complete randomness any more then evolution is a completely random process. A stochastic system allows for system changes that are both random and guided.

I am a dualist, but I don't think you need be a dualist to believe that our emergent mind can have free will.

Quote:

I should note the potential for added (but relevant) nuance here with the notion of determinism as it relates to causation. Daniel Dennett in his book Freedom Evolves makes the point that determinism and causation are not the same thing. His point is that if determinism is true then there may still be things that happen that are, so to speak, uncaused. What he means (or, I should say, what I take him to mean) is that when dealing with a highly complex phenomena- i.e. the cause of a hurricane, for example, or pin pointing the cause of a war- there may be so many variables involved that a sufficient cause cannot be identified. So we may be able to say that, in a sense, given determinism, uncaused events may nonetheless occur. I mention this because this might be one way in which we might say that an agent makes a decision that is "uncaused", although this uncaused decision is taking place in an utterly deterministic environment. The decision would still be caused by the totality of variables as they are at the time of the decision being made, we would just not be able to say that one variable was the case. I wouldn't take this to be a truly free selesction, though, in the sense that I think you are meaning it. And if this is the sense in which you mean to say that a decision is free, then I think you are inviting a host of other problems, primarily theological ones.

There is an interesting point here, but not where Dennett thinks. The interesting characteristic of chaotic dynamical systems is not whether they are "caused" or not. The characteristic of interest is there predictability. If something is indeed unpredictable then for all intents and purposes it has a stochastic component. I think maybe Dennett realises this and is trying or pretend that these systems still fit into his notion of a deterministic world.

Quote:

OC wrote:

I've never meant to imply the free willed agent was not a cause. The free willed agent of course does cause the choice.

What would it mean for a free willed agent to cause a choice to be made, but for that choice to still be a truly free, nondeterministic selection the likes of which is not possible for AI given current technology?

AI does not have the ability to make coherent non-deterministic choices. If you add non-determinism to an AI entity it will eventually lead to "psychosis" - that is it will get "lost". Now, I tried to explain what I meant by a free will choice above. You may not accept, but I think it is a reasonable position.

Quote:

OC wrote:

Good, you must agree then that if randomness exists then non-deterministic events could occur.

Not necessarily. A computer program designed to generate random numbers would be generating numbers that are random but would nonetheless be a deterministic system. So randomness is compatible with determinism and it's presence does not mean that an event is nondeterministic in the metaphysical sense. But, back to the other horn of the dilemma: how would introducing randomness at the level of decision making still allow the agent to be morally responsible for the decision?

A conscious mind seems to be able to make coherent non-deterministic choices. The set of possible choices is constrained, but still choosable among more then a single choice. Given that we can make a choice based on our desires (many of which are fee will choices). An example, we are driven by biology to procreate, yet people make a lifelong choice to be celibate. This was not a deterministic choice. They were not genetically and/or environmentally determined to be celebrate. It is important to note that many of the environmental factors are the result of a very large number and sequenced set of free will choices by other free will agents. IOW, our rational minds are responsible for our choices.

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

If no free will exists, then it is incoherent for a person to claim to be a free thinker.

Posted: Fri Feb 26, 2010 9:50 pm

OrdinaryClay wrote:

If no free will exists, then it is incoherent for a person to claim to be a free thinker.

...nice, biting wit, but... coming from a theist, inverted [look up the def. of freethought] - therefore right back at 'ya... nyaah

Posted: Sat Feb 27, 2010 7:49 pm

The OC wrote:

Your analogy is extremely rough.

I tend to agree with you. Hopefully the analogies will get better as this thread continues Very Happy

Quote:

Insects are computers too.

I would not disagree that there are similarities between insect volition and human volition, which in turn could be analogues to computers. The actions taken by insects are apparently driven by a rudimentary instinctual system, much like certain human fears are. The insect can no more be held responsible for this innate system then a human can.

Quote:

There is a large gap between the human mind and a machine. Very large.

Aside from the obvious structure differences, I seriously doubt there will be large computational or decision capacity differences for long. In fact, I wouldn't hesitate to say that the computer will surpass the human in these areas very soon. I'm fairly certain we're also working on biological computers, which will make things even more interesting.

Quote:

The truing test has never been successfully completed.

I am unfamiliar with the "truing test"... perhaps some research is in order.

Posted: Sat Feb 27, 2010 7:56 pm

OrdinaryClay wrote:

If no free will exists, then it is incoherent for a person to claim to be a free thinker.

If contra-causal free-will exists then by the same reasoning it is incoherent to believe a persons actions could be affected by things such as discipline.

Confident Learner Joined: Feb 09, 2010 Posts: 92

MockingGods wrote:

Quote:

There is a large gap between the human mind and a machine. Very large.

Aside from the obvious structure differences, I seriously doubt there will be large computational or decision capacity differences for long. In fact, I wouldn't hesitate to say that the computer will surpass the human in these areas very soon. I'm fairly certain we're also working on biological computers, which will make things even more interesting.

If your measure is pure computation then machines beat us hands down, but that is not the measure AI is interested in.

Quote:

The truing test has never been successfully completed.

I am unfamiliar with the "truing test"... perhaps some research is in order.

Oops. another typo. I meant Turing Test . Also check out Searle's Chinese Room Argument .


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